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(TRANS)FORMING SINGLE-GENDER   
SERVICES AND COMMUNAL ACCOMMODATIONS   
 
 
Introduction 
 
In July 2015, Maria Miller MP, Chairperson of the UK House of Commons Select Committee 
on Women and Equalities (‘WEC’ or ‘the Committee’), announced the establishment of a 
Transgender Equality Inquiry (‘the Inquiry’) (WEC, 2015), to consider ‘how far, and in what 
ways [transgender] people still have yet to achieve full equality; and how outstanding issues 
can most effectively be addressed’ (WEC, 2015). The scope of the Inquiry’s investigations and 
recommendations was broad, touching upon healthcare, law, education and the media (2015). 
Its most controversial proposal addressed single-gender services and communal 
accommodations. Noting the particular hardships that transgender individuals experience in 
public bathrooms, locker rooms and other segregated facilities, the Committee recommended 
that people who have obtained a Gender Recognition Certificate should be allowed to use their 
preferred gendered facilities. Responding to the Committee’s Report, the feminist scholar, Julia 
Long, warned that transgender individuals in segregated space are ‘antithetical to women’s 
rights’ and pose a ‘threat to women only spaces and women only services’ (2016). One Daily 
Mail columnist remarked that there was now ‘an official [parliamentary] approach which turns 
nature, reason and common-sense upside down’ (Littlejohn, 2016).  
 
Every jurisdiction that acknowledges the existence and status of transgender persons 
must, at some point in time, determine what legal rights individuals have to use their preferred 
gendered-spaces. In the United Kingdom, where a comparatively liberal gender recognition 
law has been in place for over a decade (Gilmore, 2015: 183), the question of segregated 
services has a growing sense of immediacy. This is particularly so in a context where, owing 
to mainstream and social media coverage, transgender identities are ever more visible (Monroe, 
2016; Jacobs, 206). Yet, transgender persons in single-gender spaces are neither a new 
controversy nor a conversation which is unique to the UK. In her landmark 1974 memoir, 
Conundrum, the author, Jan Morris, described her (and others’) uncertainty as to what facilities, 
and services, she should use after transitioning to live in her preferred female gender (2002: 
107). In North America, where Time Magazine famously declared a transgender ‘tipping point’ 
in 2014, access to single-gender bathrooms has long been a source of legal, political and 
academic concern (Chambers, 2007; Archibald, 2016). In 2016, the United States Department 
of Justice, as well as the Department of Education, issued guidelines interpreting trans 
exclusionary laws as impermissible sex discrimination under the federal Civil Rights Act 1964 
(DOJ and JOE, 2016). Even in countries, such as Ireland, Malta and Sweden, which only 
reformed their gender recognition laws in 2015, there is an increasing need to determine what 
legal rules should apply for single-gender services.  
 
Yet a striking feature of transgender legal scholarship in the UK is the absence of 
meaningful engagement with the segregation question. While debates over transgender access 
abound on television, radio and in newspaper opinion columns, British academics have largely 
failed to reflect on the rules which should apply. Instead, most scholarship remains focused on 
legal gender recognition and the rights of transgender persons within the criminal justice 
systemi. In light of the Committee’s recent recommendations, it is now an appropriate time to 
begin filling this lacuna, both so as to consider necessary reforms in the UK and to offer future 
guidance for those who will confront this topic in years to come.  This article explores the 
proper legal response to transgender use of gender segregated spaces. It approaches the 
question through the lens of the UK Equality Act 2010.   
 
The article proceeds in four parts. Part 1 sets out the broad relationship between 
transgender identities and single-gender spaces. It introduces key terms and concepts which 
affect transgender communities, and identifies the main transgender legal protections under 
UK law. Part 1 also explains the operation of single-gender services and communal 
accommodations under the Equality Act 2010 and considers how transgender individuals may 
be excluded from their preferred facilities without breaching equality guarantees.  
 
Having defined the contours of the segregation debate, Parts 2 and 3 then address the 
two overarching motivations for excluding transgender persons from single-gender spaces. In 
Part 2, the article explores the phenomenon of non-transgender ‘discomfort’. Part 2 is divided 
into three sub-sections, each discussing the related (yet conceptually distinct) questions of 
privacy, abnormal bodies and spaces of vulnerability. While the article suggests that privacy 
and body normality are normatively weak justifications for a transgender exception in the 
Equality Act 2010, it acknowledges that concerns for the proper care of vulnerable populations 
– such as occupants in women’s refuges and intimate partner violence shelters – should 
influence the way Parliament accommodates transgender individuals.  
In Part 3, the article shifts to address the second, perhaps more politically charged, 
objection to transgender inclusion; the fear of ‘misconduct’ in segregated facilities. Opponents 
of amending the Equality Act 2010 frequently cite risks of sexual assault and abuse. Extending 
greater rights to transgender communities has been equated with reducing the safety of women 
and young girls. Part 3 explores the policies and psychology which inform and produce fears 
over the ‘transgender menace’. It investigates the extent to which trans-inclusionary laws 
outside the UK have diminished the security of occupants in single-gender space. Ultimately, 
Part 3 concludes that extending access rights under the Equality Act 2010 would not negatively 
impact non-transgender users.  
 
Finally, in Part 4, the article considers three possible routes for reforming UK law. 
Focusing on body type, legal status and the obligation to increase private space, the article 
embraces the Committee’s recent recommendations and also suggests an alternative policy 
which would create a safe, workable model for respecting both transgender and non-
transgender rights.  
 
Before commencing, however, it is important to flag one final consideration relating to 
the scope and focus of the article. Throughout the substantive analysis, there is an obvious 
emphasis on transgender women and the public anxieties to which their identities give rise. 
This is an unavoidable consequence of a media and political discourse which has 
overwhelmingly concentrated on transgender females. Typical narratives arising from the 
intersection of gender identity and segregated facilities – privacy, vulnerability and sexual 
misconduct – reveal both the cultural unease which transgender women elicit, and the strong 
societal prejudice that they continue to suffer. Yet, in focusing on transgender females, this 
article does not seek to undermine or erase those persons who identify as male or who 
experience their gender on the masculine spectrum. Indeed, male-identified transgender 
persons often live at a unique intersection of oppression, confronting both transphobia and 
misogyny. The lived-realities of transgender men, and the cultural biases they encounter, are 
important and must be acknowledged. To the extent that this article emphasises transgender 
women, this merely reflects the historical contours of single-gender debates in the UK.    
 
 
 
 
Transgender Identities and Single-Gender Spaces 
 
Transgender (hereinafter ‘trans’) is an umbrella term which refers to all individuals whose 
gender identity (one’s internal sense of gender and self) and/or gender expression differs from 
the legal gender that was assigned at birth. While there are no definitive statistics for the UK’s 
trans population, it is estimated that approximately 650,000 people are gender variant (WEC, 
2016: 6). Like the ‘cisgender’ population – a term derived from the Latin word ‘cis’ (‘on this 
side of) and referring to persons who identify with their birth-assigned gender – trans 
individuals form diverse and varied communities. There is no singular trans narrative or 
experience (Green, 2004: 121). While many individuals seek to live in their ‘preferred gender’ 
(‘transition’) through medical intervention, others prioritise legal and social recognition 
(Tomchin, 2013: 843). Some trans people cannot or will not alter their sex characteristics but 
place great importance on private and public affirmation of their preferred identity. Legal 
gender recognition has particular significance for trans populations. Without a passport or birth 
certificate which confirms their lived gender, trans persons may be unable to access basic rights 
and services, including public transportation, postal services and even marriage (UNDP, 2013: 
21-23).   
 
Trans individuals in the UK enjoy considerable rights and entitlements. The Gender 
Recognition Act 2004 (hereinafter ‘the 2004 Act’) formally acknowledges the preferred gender 
of trans persons. Individuals, who have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria and who have 
lived in their preferred gender for two years, can apply for a Gender Recognition Certificate, 
and subsequently an amended birth certificate, without any requirement for sterilisation or body 
modification (e.g. gender confirming surgery, etc.).ii Trans communities are also protected 
under the Equality Act 2010 (hereinafter ‘the 2010 Act’), which prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of ‘gender reassignment’.iii Section 7(1) provides that a person falls within the scope 
of the 2010 Act if he or she ‘is proposing to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone a process 
(or part of a process) for the purpose of reassigning the person's sex by changing physiological 
or other attributes of sex.’ Individuals or organisations, such as employers, cannot 
comparatively disfavour trans persons merely because they have a gender reassignment 
characteristic.iv   
 
The 2010 Act does not require that trans persons have unfettered access to their 
preferred single-gender services or communal accommodations. The UK, like most other 
European and Commonwealth jurisdictions, operates a highly gendered model of publicly 
available facilities. Bathrooms, locker rooms and government-supported shelters are typically 
divided along binary-gender lines. Individuals are expected to use facilities according to their 
gender status, which, in the great majority of cases, is presumed to be both unambiguous and 
fixed. Although some scholars have argued that gender segregation reflects an historical 
attempt to remove women from public space (Williams, 1991; Griffin, 2008), the gender 
segregation of basic services and accommodations appears to enjoy implicit support among the 
UK population. While, in recent decades, there has been increasing promotion of women’s 
access in symbolic institutions (Gentlemen, 2016; Riach, 2014), such as colleges and private-
member clubs, there has been no equivalent call for women’s entrance into male toilets or male 
locker rooms. This perhaps reflects the fact that, unlike men-only clubs, segregated bathrooms 
are not perceived as undermining women’s status in society. Indeed, many female identified 
persons may – for reasons of sanitation, modesty or safety – actually prefer to use a public 
toilet or changing room where only women may enter.  
 
Schedule 3, Part 7(28) of the 2010 Act (hereinafter ‘the Schedule 3 Exception’) 
provides that there is no discrimination if an individual disfavours persons with a gender 
reassignment characteristic in ‘the provision of separate services for persons of each sex’v, ‘the 
provision of separate services differently for persons of each sex’vi and the ‘the provision of a 
service only to persons of one sex.’vii As a result of the Schedule 3 Exception, providers can 
remove trans individuals from gender segregated-services where exclusion furthers a legitimate 
aim.viii A similar result is achieved under Schedule 23(3) (hereinafter ‘the Schedule 23 
Exception’) of the 2010 Act. There is no discrimination if a person disfavours trans individuals 
in accessing communal accommodation or ‘benefit[s], facilit[ies] or service[s] linked to the 
accommodation.’ix Schedule 23 defines ‘communal accommodation’ as ‘residential 
accommodation[s] which [include] dormitories or other shared sleeping accommodation which 
for reasons of privacy should be used only by persons of the same sex.’x Accommodation 
providers must consider reasonable alterations to the facilityxi, the provision of additional 
spacexii and the extent to which the service is used by only one gender.xiii  
 
During the Inquiry, contributors raised considerable opposition to the Schedule 3 and 
23 exceptions, both as a matter of principle and practice (WEC, 2016: 27-30). Excluding trans 
persons from single-gender space has often been rationalised on the basis of contentious and 
somewhat questionable claims about cisgender discomfort, sexual misconduct and the 
propriety of trans bodies. While the safety of all persons who use gender-segregated services 
must be the primary focus, there is a sense that Parliament has been too willing to enact trans 
exceptions without adequately evaluating the legitimacy of those concerns which are raised 
(WEC, 2016). To the extent that exclusionary laws, such as the Schedules 3 and 23 Exceptions, 
have tangible impacts on trans lives, and may possibly expose trans individuals to violence and 
abuse, one must properly critique the need for trans-exclusionary rules. There is also concern 
that, as a matter of practice, the seemingly open-ended wording of the 2010 Act would, 
depending on the circumstances, allow providers to exclude any trans individual from their 
service or communal accommodation (WEC, 2016: 29). In their current form, the Schedules 3 
and 23 Exceptions are only limited by the requirement for a legitimate aim (a term which, even 
itself, is not clearly defined). Therefore, it is possible that providers could refuse services to 
trans persons who have undergone a full medical transition or who have even obtained a Gender 
Recognition Certificate.  
 
In the subsequent three sections, this article considers the arguments which have 
motivated the Schedules 3 and 23 Exceptions, and offers a road map for reforming the 2010 
Act.  
 
 
Discomfort 
 
Cavanagh writes that a trans ‘presence in gendered…space is confusing and upsetting to 
cissexuals’ (2010: 63). Laws which permit trans access into single-gender facilities are said to 
reduce cisgender comfort in three important ways. First, the appearance of any person, who 
was assigned male at birth, in women-only spaces violates the ‘privacy’ of other users (Tobin 
and Levi, 2013: 316). Second, focusing on trans individuals who have not chosen a full medical 
transition, cisgender persons should not be exposed to supposedly ‘unnatural’ or ‘abnormal’ 
trans bodies (i.e. men with breasts and a vagina, women with a penis) (Currah, 2008: 333). 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, many segregated facilities serve particularly vulnerable 
populations, such as survivors of intimate partner violence, and the perceived presence of 
opposite-gender users may inhibit the effective provision of services (WEC, 2016: 27-28).  
 
 
 
Privacy  
 
Laws which exclude trans persons from single-gender services and accommodations have, first, 
been justified on the basis of the claimed ‘privacy’ rights of other users (Tobin and Levi, 2013: 
316). Cisgender men and women have a right to use services, such as public bathrooms and 
changing rooms, without being ‘ogled’ (Harvard Law Review, 2015: 1736). Where they share 
single-gender services with trans individuals, so this argument goes, cisgender persons suffer 
an invasion of their privacy (Weinberg, 2009: 147). 
 
One must assume that those, who oppose trans-inclusion on the basis of privacy, are 
not defending an absolute right. It would undermine all public services and accommodations if 
every person could expect to use those facilities without being observed by another. Elkind 
notes that multi-user bathrooms are not places where individuals ‘typically have a high 
expectation of privacy’ (2007: 925). A person who chooses to enter gender-segregated 
communal spaces – even ones where that person may expose their body parts – implicitly 
accepts that he or she will be observed (but, perhaps not ‘ogled’) by the other occupants. Trans 
individuals in single-gender spaces do not ‘invade…privacy any more than anyone else who 
shares the public’ facility (Etta-Keller, 199: 370).  
 
Instead of protecting a general right to privacy, gender-segregation ensures, more 
narrowly, that women and men can access services without being observed by the opposite 
gender (Daley, 2016). The notion of privacy thus invoked arises in a uniquely gendered context. 
A male, who specifically chooses a men-only changing room, should be able to shower and 
cloth himself without encountering a female occupant. A woman, who wishes to relieve herself 
in a women-only bathroom should not have to confront a male user as she washes her hands. 
Mottet suggests that laws which extend trans access to gendered-space have historically incited 
fear because they are framed as forcing individuals to undress or share a bathroom, locker 
room, or shower with members of the opposite gender (2002: 739). A trans woman, who 
accesses her preferred gendered-space, is considered a male interloper whose presence 
inappropriately subjects occupants to the ‘male gaze’ (Bosman and Rich, 2015).  
 
Contrary to what certain commentators have argued, however, trans individuals in 
single-gender spaces do not violate ‘gendered’ privacy. Reducing trans persons to their birth-
assigned gender – as is necessary if trans women are to be considered as male interlopers – is 
inconsistent with both the trans lived experience and the conceptualisation of trans identities in 
human rights law (Chambers, 2007: 326). Wodda and Panfil write, unequivocally, that trans 
women ‘are women’ (2014: 952). They self-identify with and, where not restricted by violence 
or discrimination, live in their preferred female gender. Trans women communicate and engage 
with other persons as women. They often undertake difficult, even painful, transitions so as to 
be fully recognised as women. In the UK, as in many other jurisdictions, trans women have the 
right to have their gender legally recognised by the State. Where trans women access women-
only spaces, they are giving expression to a female, rather than a male, identity. If men and 
woman have a privacy right to enjoy segregated space free from the opposite gender, laws 
which permit trans persons to enter their preferred gendered space do not diminish that right.  
 
Paradoxically, a more credible threat to gendered privacy arises where, under the 
Schedules 3 and 23 Exceptions, individuals – who identify with, publically express and are 
perceived as having their preferred gender – must use segregated facilities which correspond 
to their birth-assigned identity. Following the enactment of a trans-exclusionary bathroom law 
in North Carolina, a number of trans men published photos of themselves using women-only 
facilities throughout the state (Wong, 2016). The image of muscular, bearded men showering 
and relieving themselves next to cisgender mothers and their young daughters illustrates how 
trans exclusionary laws fail to protect gendered privacy. As Wolf observes, forcing ‘the 
transgender person to use facilities based upon the gender…assigned at birth…[places] 
transgender men in women's bathrooms and transgender women in men’s, in visible defiance 
of the gender-segregation norm’ (2012: 214). If courts and law makers desire to offer women 
and men privacy, that goal is not furthered by mis-gendering the trans community.   
 
Abnormal bodies  
 
Many cisgender people express discomfort that a trans presence in gender-segregated space 
would expose supposedly ‘unnatural’ bodies (Harvard Law Review, 2015: 1736). Brown, for 
example, writes of feeling ‘unsafe, vulnerable, and threatened by the sight of, and proximity 
to, male genitals, even if those genitals belong to a person who…identifies as female’ (Brown, 
2014: 304). Laws which exclude trans persons from gendered accommodations and services 
reinforce the idea that, as a matter of nature, all human beings are born with one of two rigid 
body configurations. It is the fact that an individual has breasts, a vagina and a uterus that 
allows the State to recognise that person as female (Greenburg, 1999: 275). A woman who fails 
to satisfy this strict physical ideal is deemed to be biologically unnatural and should not be 
imposed upon other women in communal facilities. In essence, a trans woman who retains her 
penis is not really considered a woman. 
 
Debates over trans bodily diversity are often more hypothetical than real. Trans bodies 
are rarely, if ever, visible. Mottet observes a general reluctance among trans populations to 
expose their sex characteristics, even in designated space (2013: 418). Trans individuals are 
coerced into concealing their physical characteristics through an ‘inherent shame in having a 
body that is somehow different from the cisgender norm’ (Levassuer, 2014: 946). It is doubtful 
that, even if trans persons did have free access to single-gender services and communal 
accommodations, cisgender persons would frequently (if ever) encounter unfamiliar bodies. 
 
Even if that were not the case, however, there is at least an arguable case that concerns 
over bodily diversity do not justify exceptions, such as the Schedule 3 and 23 Exceptions. The 
idea that there are only two rigid, naturally occurring body configurations is ‘medically, 
scientifically, and factually inaccurate’ (Levesseur, 2014: 1003). Greenberg observes that a 
binary sex paradigm does not reflect reality, as ‘sex and gender range across a spectrum’ (1999, 
275). Intersex persons offer a particularly compelling challenge to rigid natural body standards. 
Intersex individuals are born with a reproductive or sexual anatomy that do not fit typical 
definitions of male or female. According to Blackless et al, ‘approximately 1.7% of all live 
births do not conform to a presumed Platonic ideal of absolute sex chromosome, gonadal, 
genital, and hormonal dimorphism’ (2000: 161). While intersex remains a minority experience, 
and most persons who identify as ‘male’ or ‘female’ do exhibit common sexed-attributes, 
intersex challenges essentialist arguments about the ‘naturalness’ of binary sex. Where a 
woman, who is assigned a female legal gender at birth, can be born with atypical sex 
characteristics, it is not unnatural for a trans women to exhibit non-normative body traits.    
 
Even conceding that bodily diversity is not per se unnatural, can one still argue that 
trans bodies are sufficiently uncommon that the 2010 Act should permit their possible 
exclusion in appropriate circumstances? Garfinkel claimed that ‘typical’ male and female 
bodies have such public acceptance that they enjoy a degree of moral authority (2006: 62). 
According to Garcia, the history of the separation of public restrooms by sex is due to the belief 
that ‘human bodies come in only two types: male and female’ (2013: 258) so that sex-
segregation of bathrooms and locker rooms constitutes a ‘social norm’ (p.258). In cases, such 
as Vancouver Rape Relief Society v Nixon (2005)xiv, deviation from binary sex has been 
considered taboo and thus harmful for both wider society and those who immediately occupy 
single-gender facilities. 
 
The problem with this ‘social norm’ reasoning is that, like Lord Devlin’s infamous 
defence of sodomy laws in the 1950s (1965), it offers little substantive or normative 
justification for legal rules which exclude trans individuals. One cannot properly defend the 
Schedules 3 and 23 Exceptions simply by pointing to the historic exclusion of trans people or 
by observing that a majority of contemporary UK society supports the current law (Hart, 1959: 
53-54). In the landmark United States Supreme Court decision, Brown v Board of Education 
of Topeka (1954), proponents of racially divided schools attempted to bolster their position, 
notoriously, by pointing to the history of American segregation since the Reconstruction. Laws 
should only exclude trans persons from their preferred accommodations and services if 
exclusion pursues a tangible social good or avoids a potential harm (Hart, 1959: 53-54).  
 
Outside spaces of vulnerability (discussed below), it is doubtful that the Schedules 3 
and 23 Exceptions advance sufficiently compelling social goals. Where a person uses a private 
stall in a women’s toilet, it is irrelevant to her fellow occupants how she urinates within those 
private confines (Jost, 2006: 391). Similarly, for persons at the urinals in a men’s bathroom, it 
is of no consequence whether those on either side are urinating through a natural penis, a 
constructed penis or a Stand-to-Pee device. Arguments asserting the need to exclude non-
normative bodies for single-gender spaces are undermined by evidence that cisgender and 
intersex individuals are not held to that same ‘normal’ body standard. Tomchin notes, 
perceptively, that ‘only transgender people are held to a definition of gender that hinges entirely 
on possessing certain body parts’ (2013: 842). Discomfort with visible breast tissue has not 
resulted in cisgender men with gynecomastia being excluded from male dormitories. Under the 
2010 Act, cisgender women cannot demand that an intersex woman, who identifies with her 
assigned female gender, be excluded from women-only changing rooms. It would be 
unthinkable that general discomfort could prevent a cisgender woman from using segregated 
showering facilities after she had a double mastectomy. In reality, UK law tolerates a 
considerable amount of bodily diversity when cisgender and intersex persons use single-gender 
spaces. Why are trans persons treated differently? Levasseur suggests that trans bodies are 
‘placed in a separate category for display and legal assessment, using sex stereotyping as a 
compass’ (2014: 1001). If cisgender and intersex persons can use women-only and men-only 
services, even when they have non-normative bodies, concerns about bodily diversity do not 
justify the current legal position under the 2010 Act.  
  
Spaces of vulnerability  
 
Some of the most common single-gender facilities in the UK are services which have been 
established to assist vulnerable populations. This includes counselling groups for gender-
related abuse and refuges for victims of intimate partner violence. In many cases, these spaces 
accommodate the needs of female-identified persons who have suffered emotional or physical 
violence at the hands of men. Jeffreys argues that ‘women’s domestic violence refuges/shelters 
and rape crisis centres…offer space in which women can feel safe, free of any threat from male 
abusers or the triggering effects of seeing and being dealt with by men’ (2014: 27-28). The 
concerns which militate against trans-inclusion in segregated refuge spaces may be 
qualitatively different from those which arise in the typical restroom or locker room scenario.  
 
A primary concern – expressed both during the drafting of the 2010 Act and during the 
Inquiry – is how including trans individuals in segregated services and communal 
accommodations might reduce the capacity to serve at-risk populations (WEC, 2016: 27-28). 
There is a fear that, if survivor facilities are open to persons who – while living and identifying 
as women – are perceived by a majority of service users as men, this would obstruct meaningful 
engagement with abuse victims (WEC, 2016: 27-28). It is not that service users are inherently 
prejudiced against trans persons, or even that they necessarily deny trans identities in a more 
general sense. Rather, the experience of male-perpetrated violence may create a heightened 
sense of discomfort in the presence of persons who are perceived – particularly because of 
physical characteristics – as sharing the male gender. In their evidence to the Inquiry, service 
providers warned that ‘[s]some…women may feel unable to access services provided by or 
offered jointly to all women including transwomen’ (WEC, 2016: 27-28).  
 
The discomfort of vulnerable individuals plays a significant role in maintaining the 
Schedule 3 and 23 Exceptions. The Explanatory Notes to the 2010 Act specifically envisage a 
‘counselling session…provided for female victims of sexual assault’ where the ‘[t]he 
organisers do not allow transsexual people to attend as they judge that the clients who attend 
the group session are unlikely to do so if a male-to-female transsexual person was also there.’xv 
While (as discussed further below) trans women pose no physical threat to cisgender women 
in refuges or survivor spaces, it is perhaps understandable that abuse victims will nevertheless 
be sensitive to those who – whether voluntarily or involuntarily – have been masculinized by 
society. This sensitivity which survivors experience is real, and it is important that policy 
makers create appropriate structures to address the complex, individualised needs of these 
persons. It may be that, while the law can generally open gender segregated-spaces (toilets, 
locker rooms, fitting rooms, etc.) to all trans individuals, there needs to be a small, sub-section 
of services where stricter polices, perhaps based on legal gender, continue to apply. In its 
recommendations to Parliament, the Women and Equalities Committee concedes that there 
‘does need to be some limited ability to exercise discretion, if this is a proportionate means of 
achieving a legitimate aim’ (2016: 32).  
 
It is important to note, however, that there are equally compelling reasons why trans 
individuals should have access to their preferred shelters and refuges. Trans individuals suffer 
disproportionately high rates of physical and sexual violence (EU AFR, 2015). In July 2016, 
the British newspaper, The Independent, reported a ‘170 per cent rise in crime’ against the trans 
community, including ‘[s]exual assaults, other kinds of violence, threatening behaviour and 
other kinds of harassment’ (Yeung, 2016). According to the LGBT rights organisation, 
Stonewall, almost 40% of trans individuals in the UK have experienced physical intimidation 
and threats (Stonewall, 2016). Like their cisgender counterparts (perhaps even more so), trans 
communities have a need for safe, secure and affirming survival services. Removing trans-
women from the relative shelter of women-only counselling or women-only shelters denies 
much-needed resources to a recognised high-risk group. If policy makers are concerned to 
safeguard vulnerable women, trans women should be also be a priority.  
 
It may be possible to protect cisgender women’s sense of security without excluding 
trans persons. Wenstrom suggests that concerns about vulnerability can be adequately 
addressed by adopting appropriate admissions and information procedures (2008: 149). Many 
UK service providers, which already cater for vulnerable trans woman, engage all users in a 
process of frank and open dialogue that both affirms trans identities and encourages a sense of 
security. Upon arrival, trans and cisgender women are offered information about the entry 
requirements and policies, as well as the rules on physical and sexual conduct that will not be 
tolerated by staff. According to Griffin, the adoption of ‘clear written policies and language’ 
communicates to all individuals that a provider ‘respects transgender persons (and the law)’ 
and can advise individuals of how to behave appropriately (2008: 436). Where cisgender 
women are informed about the presence of trans women, as well the existing codes of 
behaviour, ‘experience shows that non-transgender women respect transgender residents and 
understand that they pose no additional safety risks’ (Wenstrom, 2008: 149). Accordingly, even 
within the more contentious sub-category of gendered spaces aimed towards vulnerable users, 
justifications that centre on discomfort tend to be overstated, and can indeed be accommodated 
within a more nuanced, non-discriminatory approach.  
 
Misconduct 
 
In addition to concerns about discomfort, a second, and perhaps more politically relevant, 
objection to trans persons in single-gender services and communal accommodations is the 
perceived threat of physical misconduct. First, advocates of trans exclusion argue that allowing 
access to single-sex facilities promotes consensual sexual intercourse. Focusing on trans 
women, who they mis-gender as heterosexual men, advocates suggest that placing opposite-
gendered persons in intimate spaces inevitably leads to improper sexual behaviour (Spade, 
2009: 214). Second, trans inclusion is opposed in order to avoid sexual assaults (Wenstrom, 
2008: 148). Relying upon depictions of trans persons as unstable, deviant and predatory, there 
are claims that trans women pose a direct threat to cisgender women in shared space (Long, 
2016). There is also a fear that, if trans men enter male-only facilities, they may also be exposed 
to sexual harassment and abuse (Heroux, 2015). Finally, many individuals – policy makers and 
lay-observers alike – argue that allowing trans access to single-sex accommodation would 
become an instrument of abuse for cisgender males who seek access to women-only spaces 
(Steinmetz, 2015).  
 
The myth of the trans predator  
 
The myth of the trans predator operates on the idea that trans persons, particularly trans women, 
pose a threat of sexual violence to cisgender persons. Both feminist and conservative scholars, 
in the UK and beyond, have long argued that trans persons should be excluded from their 
preferred single-gender spaces as a means of protecting bodily integrity rights (Long, 2016). 
According to Brydum, there is a ‘“provably false” fear that trans people inherently threaten the 
safety of cisgender women and children’ (2015).   
 
Supporting trans-exclusionary laws, such as the Schedules 3 and 23 Exceptions, by 
reference to sexual misconduct is problematic. It suggests that trans persons are sexual 
deviants, who target the cisgender population and who are incapable of complying with rules 
on proper sexual conduct. Characterising trans individuals as predators reflects a deeply 
engrained social prejudice. It is supported by neither legal nor medical evidence (Maza and 
Brinkler, 2014). In response to the Women and Equalities Committee’s recommendations, 
Long complained that the Trans Equality Inquiry had ignored research undertaken in Sweden 
which, she claimed, found that trans women commit violent crime, including sex offending, at 
the same rates as cisgender men (2016). However, the research that Long references – a 2011 
article by Dhejne et al – makes no suggestion that trans women are a rape risk. Indeed, as the 
first author notes, ‘claims about trans criminality, specifically rape likelihood, is 
misrepresenting the study findings’ (Williams, 2015). In reality, there is no peer-reviewed 
scholarship which proves, or even suggests, that trans individuals, as a class, pose a threat of 
sexual violence to cisgender populations (Yoshino, 2006).  
 
As noted above, the existing research actually illustrates that, rather than instigating 
sexual violence, trans persons are disproportionately the victims of rape and sexual assault in 
segregated spaces (Gehi and Arkles, 2007: 17). Where the law prohibits trans access to single-
gender facilities, trans individuals must reveal their birth-assigned gender and expose 
themselves to the risk of transphobic abuse. Recent evidence suggests that up to 70% of trans 
individuals have experienced ‘denied access, verbal harassment, and/or physical assault when 
trying to access or while using gendered public restrooms’ (Herman, 2013: 77). Transphobia 
in segregated-spaces can significantly decrease life quality, precipitating ‘absences from work 
and school’, ‘choosing to not participate in public life’ and ‘avoiding particular places or 
events’ (Herman, 2013: 77). While removing the Schedules 3 and 23 Exceptions would not 
compromise cisgender safety, it would considerably enhance the welfare and protection of trans 
communities.  
 
 
Sexually deviant men  
 
Concerns relating to misconduct also assume that trans women, irrespective of self-
identification and gender expression, are men. Observers argue that allowing trans women to 
enter women-only facilities is equivalent to welcoming cisgender males (Ditum, 2016). If there 
are policy reasons for excluding men from gender-segregated spaces, so too trans women, 
particularly those who do not medically transition, should be barred. Opposing any change to 
the 2010 Act, Ditum warned that ‘94% of violence against women is committed by men’ 
(2016). The implications of Ditum’s arguments are clear: trans women are men, they commit 
male-pattern violence and they should be excluded from female-only space.  
 
From a human rights perspective, denying the true identity of trans women disregards 
their lived identities and personal experience of gender. As noted, trans women are women. 
They live their lives in their preferred female gender. As a group, trans women are as diverse 
in their make-up and characteristics as any other female population. Different trans women 
respond differently to similar situations, including their proximity to female-only services and 
communal accommodations. However, if UK law operates upon a general presumption that 
cisgender women can share segregated spaces without inappropriate sexual activity, the 
courtesy of that presumption should also be extended to trans persons. As in the general female 
population, many trans women have no interest whatsoever in a voluntary sexual relationship 
with a person of the same gender. A large number of trans persons, just like those in the 
cisgender community, experience only opposite-gender attraction. On the other hand, some 
trans women are indeed lesbian-identified (de Sutter et al, 200). Yet, unless service providers 
are excluding all women with same-gender attractions – cisgender and transgender – there is 
no justification for excluding only trans women. Considering that the 2010 Act does not permit 
gay persons to be excluded from women-only and men-only services and accommodations, 
there is no logical reason for a specific trans exception.  
 
Excluding trans women promotes the ‘sexist and heterosexist assumption that a 
[person] with a penis will inevitably attack and rape a female’ (Wenstrom, 2008: 151). 
Irrespective of whether trans women are actually deviant or really men, it is argued that 
segregated-spaces should bar trans females on the sole basis that individuals with ‘male’ 
genitalia are dangerous (Wenstrom, 2008: 148). Cavanagh observes an ‘antiquated and 
heterosexist construction of masculinity…[whereby] “if a man sees a woman, just a glimpse, 
he cannot be controlled”’ (2010: 78). Like concerns relating to sexual deviancy, ‘penis as 
predator’ reasoning is both offensive and troublingly overbroad. It implicates each trans 
woman, who retains her penis, and all cisgender men. It not only encourages a damaging vision 
of male identities, but also reduces women to passive, unwilling prey: women are constructed, 
inherently, as ‘potential victims’ (Cavanagh, 2010: 78). The notion of the ‘unequivocally 
violent penis’ is unsubstantiated in wider criminology research, and has little impact on how 
gendered-spaces actually operate in the UK. If the presence of any male genitalia automatically 
compromises the sexual safety of cisgender women, why are male staff permitted to work in 
prisons or women-only education institutions? Claims that all persons with a penis are 
dangerous does not support a legal rule which allows trans persons to be removed from single-
gender spaces.  
 
Cisgender abuse  
 
In recent years, the politics of trans inclusion has been increasingly focused on fraud and abuse. 
Even if critics concede that trans persons do not pose a heightened threat in single-gender 
facilities, they nevertheless oppose extending trans rights on the basis that they will be abused 
by cisgender males (Tobin and Levi, 2013: 326). In seeking the repeal, or rejection, of laws 
that would permit trans persons to use their preferred facilities, opponents have consistently 
relied upon graphic, child-focused threats. Within the US, for instance, a recurring tool has 
been short media advertisements, which suggest that greater trans protections will serve as 
cover for paedophile males who follow young girls into restrooms (Campaign for Houston, 
2015). In November 2015, opponents of an Equal Rights Ordinance in Houston, Texas, used 
the threat of cisgender abuse to defeat proposed anti-discrimination protections (Dart and 
Redden, 2015).  
 
It is both intellectually and practically unsatisfactory to exclude trans persons from 
single-gender facilities because other, non-trans individuals (over whom trans communities 
have no control), may engage in illegal conduct. General public sexism cannot undermine the 
capacity of women to work, and should not legitimise anti-woman practices as applied in the 
workplace. Similarly, general public homophobia is not evidence that gay and lesbian couples 
are unsuitable parents, and should not restrict their right to adopt or access assisted 
reproduction. In the same way, public concern about cisgender predators – whether organic or 
encouraged by advocates – does not demonstrate a pressing need for laws which remove trans 
individuals from women-only or men-only facilities. On the contrary, it simply proves that, 
while trans persons pose no heightened threat, there is a sub-category of cisgender men who 
are willing to carry out improper acts. These individuals should be targeted for appropriate, 
properly-directed sanction. The 2010 Act should not deny trans persons full equality because 
another, unrelated class of persons intends to break the law.  
This line of reasoning applies equally to the claims of trans men who are removed from 
male spaces to prevent their physical and sexual assault. Policy makers have defended such 
exclusionary rules, similarly, on the basis that they protect trans men’s welfare (Heroux, 2015). 
Yet, focusing on the conduct of trans men suggests, at least tacitly, that the prospective victims 
of violence are responsible for avoiding future injury, even if this requires that they refrain 
from morally unobjectionable acts. By excluding trans men from male-only space, the law 
normalises (even legitimises) male violence in bathrooms and locker rooms. Rather than 
condemning the violence of cisgender men in gendered space, exclusionary policies condemn 
trans men who ‘unreasonably’ expect to use male facilities without harm. This approach 
mirrors long-running public discussions on sexual offences whereby, under a process termed 
‘victim blaming’ (Carlson, 2014), female victims are considered partially responsible for their 
assault because they consume alcohol, reveal skin or traverse the streets unaccompanied. No 
person has the right, irrespective of another’s conduct, to sexually assault that other and there 
are no circumstances which justify violence in male-only spaces. The 2010 Act should not 
permit the removal of trans men from male-only spaces to protect them. They should ensure 
safe, accessible conditions in single-gender facilities so that all men, cisgender and trans, can 
inhabit those facilities without fear of injury.  
 
UK laws do not generally prohibit permissible conduct merely because there is a threat, 
however remote, that somebody may ultimately engage in the conduct for an unintended 
purpose. The fact that a person may drive under the influence of alcohol does not cast doubt 
upon the continuing desirability of driving rights. If authorities foresee a likelihood that certain 
rights or conduct may be exploited, the solution is not to abolish or suspend the entitlements in 
question. Instead, the authorities should put in place sufficient sanctions which discourage and 
censure abuse. In the context of driving, consuming an impermissible level of alcohol may 
result in a fine, loss of driving privileges or, in extreme cases, a custodial sentence. Establishing 
a supervisory framework targets (and largely avoids) the general public harm of drunk-driving, 
without requiring the removal of all motor vehicles. A similar approach should be applied to 
the threat of cisgender predators. If Parliament believes that trans access to single-gender 
services facilitates physical and sexual assault, they should put in place laws which censure, 
and punish, men who attack women in bathrooms and locker rooms. Indeed, as West observes, 
‘[w]e already have laws against sexual predation and harassment in public toilets – they’re 
called laws’ (2016).  
 
Excluding trans individuals risks creating a false sense of safety in single-gender 
services and communal accommodations. Abuse-focused arguments frequently imply that, if 
trans women are not allowed to enter single-gender facilities, cisgender predators will be 
definitively prevented from attacking vulnerable women and girls (Spade, 2009: 216). This 
way of thinking is, at best, overly optimistic, and, at worst, worrying naïve. Archibald cautions 
that the ‘inconvenience of entering a bathroom marked “women”’ is unlikely to deter a person 
planning harassment, assault, or rape (2014: 68). Laws which exclude trans individuals do not 
significantly impede cisgender predators, and they should not be used as a means of absolving 
law makers from their obligation to create safe, secure services and accommodations. Trans 
people should not be arbitrarily sacrificed to enact blunt safeguards that will not meaningfully 
protect women (Wolf, 2012: 207).  
 
Existing research suggests that, despite the near-continuous proliferation of abuse-
inspired arguments, there have been few reported instances of cisgender men falsely asserting 
a trans identity to access women-only spaces and commit crime. There have been well-
publicised incidents where cisgender persons – typically male-identified – have, without 
claiming a trans identity, entered women’s facilities either to highlight the purportedly 
‘ridiculous’ character of trans protections or to incorrectly assert that trans inclusion effectively 
de-genders all public space (Morrow, 2016; Ellis Nutt, 2015) However, in terms of the specific 
threats envisaged by trans opponents – the man who actually asserts a female gender to 
stealthily commit a crime – there have been no reported cases (Maza and Brinkler, 2014). As 
Sterling notes, those who oppose trans inclusion have ‘failed to provide statistics, studies, or 
facts to verify their assertions’ regarding cisgender predators, meaning that such claims are, 
essentially, ‘merely conjecture’ (2014: 771) On the contrary, in fact, there is ‘evidence to 
refute’ such claims (2014: 771). The Schedules 3 and 23 Exceptions are thus a solution in 
search of a problem.  
 
It is not surprising that cisgender men have, in reality, not adopted a ‘trans strategy’ to 
enter women-only spaces. Keisling suggests that, in many cases, gender recognition would 
actually inhibit the ability to hide one’s identity (Mottet, 2013: 414). Where – in order to evade 
detection – a cisgender man self-identifies as a trans woman, he may in fact find his identity 
subject to closer scrutiny, particularly if he does not also medically or socially transition. A 
cisgender man, who falsely expresses a female gender, but who continues to present in his 
preferred male gender, is in the same position as trans women who, for personal or social 
reasons, engage in only a limited process of physical transition so that their appearance may 
not conform with societal understandings of typical ‘femininity’ or ‘femaleness’. Just as these 
latter individuals are continuously required to explain and validate their identity, so too a 
cisgender man who deceitfully expresses a female gender, without actually living that gender, 
is likely to draw increased attention.  
 
 
Trans Inclusion in Single-Gender Services and Accommodations – Possible 
Solutions 
 
As the Women and Equalities Committee notes, questions regarding trans identities in single-
gender services and communal accommodations are ‘sensitive areas’ (WEC, 2016: 32). The 
sheer volume of media and political attention which is increasingly directed towards defining 
who can (and, perhaps more relevantly, cannot) enter gendered facilities underlines the urgency 
of finding safe, workable solutions. In formulating a response to the issue, Parliament must 
keep in mind the policy rationales which justify maintaining gendered spaces, particularly 
services which cater to vulnerable women. Yet, there must equally be recognition of trans 
individuals and a proper evaluation of the risks they create in single-gender facilities.   
 
There are at least three possible ways of reforming the 2010 Act to remove the current 
ambiguity surrounding single-gender services and communal accommodations. A first solution 
is to amend the Schedule 3 and 23 Exceptions so that trans persons are definitively excluded 
until they exhibit a typical or ‘normal’ body configuration. If cisgender men are unwilling to 
shower in the presence of a man who has breasts and a vagina, trans men should be able to 
enter single-gender facilities where they have undergone chest and phallosplasty surgery. 
While one might argue that it is legitimate to exclude trans men who retain typically ‘female’ 
physical characteristics, the 2010 Act should at least accommodate those who have completed 
a full, medical transition. In many jurisdictions, the law restricts not only access to gendered 
space, but also legal gender recognition, to those persons who have altered internal and external 
body attributes. In countries, such as Japan, Ukraine and Turkey, trans persons cannot be 
acknowledged by the law unless they achieve a conventionally ‘male’ or ‘female’ appearance, 
including by the presence of ‘gender-appropriate’ genitals. A primary justification for the 
continued medicalisation of legal gender recognition is the impact which reform would have 
on single-gender services (Wenstrom, 2008: 144).  
Using bodily characteristics as the metric for trans inclusion in segregated services and 
accommodations would, however, be both retrograde and highly inappropriate. Since the 2004 
Act, UK law has acknowledged that the validity of trans identities does not depend on medical 
status or physical appearance. Indeed, in line with recent reforms in Ireland, Denmark and 
Malta, the Committee recommends that individuals should now be able to obtain a gender 
recognition certificate without any health care intervention – physical or psychological (WEC, 
2016: 14). Many trans persons do not want to – or cannot for health, economic or age reasons 
– undergo a medical transition (Spade, 2009: 160). This does not mean that these individuals 
are any less committed to their preferred gender (Tobin, 2006; 401). It simply reflects the fact 
that, for a multiplicity of causes, trans persons in the UK are often not in a position to alter their 
bodies. As Green has argued, there is no reason that trans individuals ‘should [not] have their 
gender identity validated’ simply because they lack the capacity – financial or physical – to 
undergo gender confirming surgeries (2004: 42).  
 
As UK law increasingly appreciates that sex characteristics do not determine legal 
gender, so too there is a growing understanding that body features should not override a 
person’s lived identity. It would certainly be incongruent if, under the 2004 Act, a trans man, 
who does not have a penis, could be formally recognised as male, but, under the 2010 Act, he 
can be excluded from men-only spaces. Conditioning access to gendered-space on body 
configuration prioritises only the most privileged trans persons (e.g. those who have the 
economic or health resources to medically transition). These individuals are often the least 
reliant on public services and accommodations, such as communal bathrooms and shelters. A 
‘body test’ would fall hardest on resource-deprived groups and further isolate those who are 
already marginalized within trans communities. They encourage greater gender policing in all 
segregated-space, affecting both trans and cisgender persons alike. If entry into women-only 
and men-only facilities requires compliance with normative gender, this would also restrict 
persons who, while identifying with their birth-assigned gender, do not satisfy general 
assumptions about male and female appearance (Golgowski, 2016).  
 
The second, more palatable, solution is extending access to all trans persons who have 
obtained a Gender Recognition Certificate. If segregated-space is exclusively available to men 
or women, there should be entry for all persons who enjoy that legal gender. In its Report, the 
Committee recommends that ‘the single-sex / separate services provision’ in the 2010 Act 
should ‘not apply in relation to discrimination against a person whose acquired gender has been 
recognised under the Gender Recognition Act 2004’ (WEC, 2016: 32).  
 
As compared with the first, body-centred solution, using legal gender as the metric of 
access has a number of advantages. First, it avoids awkward conversations about how to 
‘assess’ gender. If entry into a restroom or locker room requires evidence of a penis, it is unclear 
how service providers should comply. Would all prospective users have to reveal their genitals? 
Such a scenario not only raises concerns about personal privacy but also hinges on an operator’s 
willingness to carry out the necessary investigations. Second, focusing on legal gender, as 
opposed to body configurations, is a more objective, measurable standard. The inherent 
diversity of human bodies means that any test based on one, normative body type will 
inevitably be unstable and unworkable (Tomchin, 2013: 842). This can be seen in the 
comparisons between the 2010 Act’s implied inclusion of non-normative cisgender/intersex 
bodies and the possible exclusion of trans individuals. Legal gender is a more defined, 
quantifiable marker against which to determine a person’s legal rights. Amending the 
Schedules 3 and 23 Exceptions, so that they embrace all legal men and women, would create a 
definitive, unambiguous legal standard. While any such reform might be more easily satisfied 
by cisgender and intersex communities, access-through-legal-recognition confers benefits 
which are not subject to individual beliefs about proper or acceptable bodies.  
 
One must acknowledge, however, that even ‘entry based on legal status’ is not without 
problems. Although the 2004 Act radically improves access to gender recognition, formal legal 
acknowledgement remains out of reach for many trans persons. During the Inquiry, numerous 
witnesses explained how a culture of isolation, as well as economic and resource challenges, 
continue to impede access to gender recognition, even under the UK’s comparatively liberal 
regime (WEC, 2016: 11-14). The requirement to obtain a diagnosis of gender dysphoria, 
coupled with high rates of trans discrimination throughout the National Health Service, prevent 
many UK trans persons from using the 2004 Act (WEC, 2016: 35-42). In the past two years, 
there have been several cases where trans women, subject to a custodial sentence, have been 
placed in male prison units because, despite living in their preferred gender, they had not been 
able to obtain formal gender recognition (Morris, 2015 and Allisson and Pidd, 2015). The 
Committee has recommended that, having regard to the insurmountable hurdles which 
individuals currently face, Parliament should introduce a system of gender self-determination 
(WEC, 2016: 14). There is also the question of what facility, during the mandatory two-year 
period where a trans individual lives in their preferred gender but does not have formal 
recognition, a person should be entitled to use.  
 
Such concerns do not necessarily disqualify gender recognition as the appropriate 
marker against which to judge access to single-gender services. Considering that many trans 
persons do obtain gender recognition, one might conclude that, given the various competing 
interests to be balanced, using gender recognition is a fair, even-handed solution. In the 
particular context of spaces of vulnerability, it may be easier to allay other users’ fears where 
not only do trans occupants live in their preferred gender but also where they are legally 
acknowledged as women. It is, therefore, little surprise that the Committee favoured this 
common sense approach. At the very least, Parliament should amend the 2010 Act accordingly. 
What concerns about the gender recognition process do reveal, however, is that,  even where 
there is a relatively flexible test for obtaining preferred legal status, the requirement to be 
acknowledged in law may mean that some trans individuals (likely the most vulnerable and at-
risk groups) will still be excluded from their preferred single-gender facilities.  
 
A final, possibly optimal, solution (one increasingly adopted in the United States) is to 
create enhanced privacy options for all service-users. According to Tobin and Levi, the solution 
is not to segregate or exclude the person who offends the majoritarian position, but rather, to 
increase privacy options for everyone where possible (2013: 326). If concerns about privacy 
lie at the heart of the Schedules 3 and 23 Exceptions, increasing privacy controls reduces the 
need to remove trans individuals. Enhanced privacy can be achieved in one of two ways (or 
through a mixture of both). On the one hand, service and accommodation providers could offer 
greater numbers of single-user facilities, such as personal shower stalls and toilet cubicles. This 
solution is already implied under the Schedule 23 Exception.xvi Individualising facilities 
decreases the need for uncomfortable interactions, and offers individuals more control over the 
extent to which they see or are seen by others (Tobin and Levi, 2013: 326). On the other hand, 
jurisdictions such as Washington State and Connecticut, have adopted policies which allow 
persons, who may feel uneasy sharing segregated spaces, to access specialised locations where 
they can dress or shower in private (Tobin and Levi, 2013: 312). Washington's Superintendent 
of Public Instruction, for example, has recommended that ‘[a]ny student - transgender or not - 
who has a need or desire for increased privacy, regardless of the underlying reason, should be 
provided access to an alternative restroom’ (Tobin and Levi, 2013: 312). 
 
The American experience can serve as a blueprint for reforming the 2010 Act. Instead 
of the Schedules 3 and 23 Exceptions, the 2010 Act could require service providers to offer, 
where reasonably practicable, additional, individualised facilities so that persons, who do not 
wish to share the general services or accommodations, can access relevant benefits (shelter, 
bathrooms, etc.) in private. The additional locations should be available to all persons – 
irrespective of gender identity – and entrance should depend upon voluntary consent. In 
particular, individualised services and accommodations should not be used as half-way houses 
for trans individuals who are comfortable using general facilities. While providing a ‘third 
option’, exclusive to trans persons, might release trans women from the threat of abuse in men-
only spaces, it would also serve to reinforce, and perhaps even strengthen, cultural perceptions 
of the trans community as ‘others’. While acknowledging both policy and political constraints, 
there is a compelling argument that trans individuals should (at least as a matter of principle) 
be fully integrated into general segregated-spaces.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The question of trans access into single-gender services and communal accommodations is 
neither novel nor unique. Since the first public consciousness of trans identities, there has been 
debate as to what services and facilities individuals should be entitled to use post-transition. 
Where a trans woman lives and expresses her preferred female gender, should she be entitled 
to enter women-only restrooms or should she be consigned to services available only to men?  
 
In the legal context – both academic and practical – the rights of trans persons in the 
UK to use their preferred facilities remains a largely underexplored concern. Within the 
existing British scholarship, commentators have tended to focus on legal gender recognition, 
without fully considering the more practical, quotidian challenges that confront trans 
individuals after they are recognised. The precise requirements for being acknowledged as a 
man are undoubtedly important. However, one must also consider what rights, entitlements and 
obligations a person has once he obtains his preferred male status.  
 
Within the wider trans rights movement, particularly in North America, there are 
growing calls to ‘de-gender’ public spaces and accommodations. Where men and women can 
equally share dormitories, locker rooms and toilet facilities, there would be no need to 
determine when trans individuals can use their preferred facilities (Lee Ball, 2015; Scelfo, 
2015; O’Conner, 2016). On university campuses, upscale restaurants and cultural centres, 
administrators increasingly offer all-gender facilities which are available for use irrespective 
of gender identity. In the UK, the 2010 Act has attempted to strike a complicated balance, 
establishing a general right to equality for trans communities but permitting trans exclusion 
from single-gender spaces where a reasonable justification exists. The 2010 Act seeks to 
establish a workable compromise, which caters to the needs of all interested parties. Yet, the 
Schedules 3 and 23 Exceptions have resulted in a patchwork legal regime which, at best, 
remains unclear, and, at worst, encourages arbitrary and capricious decisions to exclude.   
 
The primary goal of any rule governing single-gender spaces must be the protection of 
all occupants. Where there is evidence that trans inclusion in gendered-services and 
accommodations does reduce public security, there is ample justification for adopting 
exclusionary laws. Yet, the legal and policy arguments, which have thus far been offered in 
defence of the 2010 Act, lack a compelling normative basis. Trans individuals do not threaten 
the cisgender population in single-gender services. Trans bodies may, depending upon medical 
treatment, not fit common binary expectations, but they are not unnatural. Their presence 
should not shock, offend or disgust. There is no evidence – anecdotal or research-based – which 
supports the proposition that trans individuals  are inherently violent. Trans communities are 
as diverse and varied in their make-up as any cisgender group. While there may be trans 
individuals who have committed, or will commit, violent crimes, that is also true of the myriad 
other communities who enjoy automatic access to their preferred gendered-space. There is also 
little (if any) support for the idea that trans protections facilitate cisgender predators who feign 
a trans identity to perpetrate assaults in women-only space. In reality, concerns over the 
supposed threat of trans identities often reveal lingering anti-trans prejudice, reproducing 
historic tropes about the ‘deviant’, ‘deceptive’ or ‘unstable’ trans individual.  
 
Moving forward, a number of options exist for Parliament to create a clearer, less 
ambiguous policy on access to gendered spaces. Perhaps the most realistic, politically feasible, 
solution is to use legal gender recognition as a proxy for entry. All persons who have obtained 
a Gender Recognition Certificate should, irrespective of body characteristics, be entitled to use 
their preferred services and accommodations. A test based on legal status is both logical and 
highly defensible. If a person is recognised in law as a woman, there is no reason why she 
should be excluded from women-only spaces. A second, more contentious solution, is to 
encourage greater privacy options for all service users. Service providers would be required to 
increase individualised service or accommodation units. Where a person is uncomfortable 
accessing a service with the general population – which should include trans individuals in 
their preferred spaces – he or she would have the opportunity to use a private facility. 
Ultimately, it is Parliament who will decide the appropriate standard to adopt. While 
prioritising the safety of all users, law makers should also aim for rules which respect and 
uphold the dignity of trans communities.   
 
 
Notes  
 
i Sharpe A (2016) Expanding Liability for Sexual Fraud through the concept of “active 
deception”: A Flawed Approach. Journal of Criminal Law 80(1): 28; Dunne P (2015) Ten 
Years of Gender Recognition in the United Kingdom: Still a Model for Reform? Public Law: 
530; Grabham E (2010) Governing permanence: trans subjects, time, and the Gender 
Recognition Act. Social and Legal Studies 19(1): 107; Cowan S (2009) Looking Back 
(To)Wards the Body: Medicalisation and the GRA. Social and Legal Studies 18(2): 247. 
 
ii Gender Recognition Act 2014, s. 2(1)(a) and (b). 
 
iii s. 7(1). 
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vi Sch 3, Pt 3(28)(2)(b). 
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viii Sch 3, Pt 3(28)(1).  
 
ix Sch 23(3)(1)(b). 
 
x Sch 23(3)(5). 
 
xi Sch 23(3)(3)(a). 
 
xii Sch 23(3)(3)(a). 
 
xiii Sch 23(3)(3)(b). 
 
xiv [2005] BCCA 601; see Boyle C (2011) A Human Right to Group Self-Determination – 
Reflections on Nixon v Vancouver Rape Relief Society. Canadian Journal of Women and the 
Law 23(2): 488; Chambers L (2007) Unprincipled Exclusions: Feminist Theory, Transgender 
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xv Equality Act 2010, Explanatory Notes [740]. 
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